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Hacks: Maintaining Election 
Integrity in the Digital Age
PAIGE REINAUER*© 
INTRODUCTION 
After the tumultuous 2000 presidential election, many 
states opted to conduct their elections through electronic 
voting devices.1 However, with concerns about data breach, 
voter fraud, and election hacking becoming increasingly 
prominent in America’s public discourse, reaching an apex 
during the 2016 presidential election, many states have 
passed legislation reverting to a paper-based method.2 This 
has left the United States with a patchwork approach to 
voting technology. Importantly, many of these new 
approaches to voting corrected past identified problems, 
whilst simultaneously uncovering new vulnerabilities.3 This 
paper seeks to analyze the history of voting technology in 
the United States, the current state of voting, and the 
implications of the different approaches to voting technology 
utilized by the states. Ultimately, this paper will conclude 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
* J.D. 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
© Paige Reinauer 2019. 
1 Clive Thompson, Can You Count on Voting Machines?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06 
Vote-t.html. 
2 Elizabeth Weise, Paper Ballots are Back in Vogue Thanks to Russian 
Hacking Fears, USA TODAY (Sep. 19, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www. 
usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/09/19/russia-hacking-election-fears-
prompts-states-to-switch-to-paper-ballots/666020001/.  
3 See infra Part VI. 
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that the best and most likely way forward is through the 
standardized use of scan-technology voting to address 
concerns of both verifiability and efficiency.  
I. THE HISTORY OF VOTING METHODS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
From the founding of the United States until the late 1800s, 
hand-counted paper ballots were the only type of voting 
equipment used. 4  Voters typically obtained pre-printed 
ballots with the names of the candidates for which they 
wished to vote.5 However, vote-buying scandals throughout 
the early nineteenth century led to the “adoption of the 
Australian secret ballot, which was developed in 1856.” 6
Under this system, ballots listed the names of the 
candidates, and voters marked their choices in private. 7
However, hand-counted paper ballots faded in prominence 
throughout the late 20th century with the emergence of 
better technology, as the process of interpreting paper 
ballots was both time consuming and error prone due to 
undecipherable marking.8 By 2000, only 1.3% of voters in 
the United States, mainly in rural areas, voted with hand-
counted paper ballots.9
The decline of the paper ballot coincided with the 
first major advancement in voting technology, the lever 
voting machine, which was developed during the early 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4 Clive Thompson, Can You Count on Voting Machines?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/ 
06Vote-t.html. 
5 Elizabeth King, How the U.S. Ended Up with Today’s Paper Ballots,
TIME (Apr. 26, 2016), http://time.com/4305508/paper-ballot-history/.  
6  Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and 
Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2005). 
7 Id. at 1718-19. 
8 Id. at 1719. 
9 Id.
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twentieth century. 10  The lever voting machine “was 
designed to address the possibility of tampering with paper 
ballots, since there is no document to tamper with.” 11
However, this was not the only major pre-twenty-first 
century advancement in voting technology. In 1964 a new 
form of voting technology emerged, punch-card ballots, the 
first technology to use computers to count votes. 12
Ultimately, these technologies nearly phased out hand-
counted paper ballots entirely. By 1980, during the election 
between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, the two most 
common voting systems utilized by the states were punch-
card devices and lever machines.13
However, these methods also fell victim to the same 
fate as hand-counted ballots. Lever machines, which were 
first invented in the 1890s, seemed bulky by the late 
twentieth century, and furthermore were expensive to 
maintain and repair. 14  This led to these machines being 
phased out over the next twenty years.15 New York was the 
last state to phase out lever machines, officially retiring 
them in 2010.16 Punch cards better withstood the test of 
time, maintaining relevance throughout the 1990s, but 
ultimately “lost ground to optical-scan and electronic 
systems”.17 By 2000, optical-scan ballots were used by 27.5% 
of voters, second only in use to punch cards.18 However, that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. 1719-20. 
13  Drew Desilver, On Election Day, Most Voters Use Electronic or 
Optical-Scan Ballots, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-most-
voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/.  
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1721. 
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same year accelerated the punch card’s decline. The nail in 
the coffin came in the form of the “2000 Florida election 
recount debacle that brought the term ‘hanging chad’” into 
the cultural vocabulary.19 This election demonstrated the 
pitfalls of punch card voting as many issues arose 
surrounding these ballots. Such issues included 
misunderstandings over which punch-hole corresponded 
with which candidate, cards being incompletely punched, 
and several other consistent problems with 
decipherability.20
Ultimately, in the wake of the 2000 election, states 
turned to electronic machines to avoid a prolonged and 
contested ballot counting process.21 These states were aided 
by a $3 billion federal investment in electronic voting 
machines in response to the 2000 presidential election.22
Additionally, many of these changes on the state-level were 
now mandated.23
In 2002, the United States Congress passed the Help 
America Vote Act (“HAVA”).24 The purpose of the Act was to 
implement reform to the country’s voting process.25 HAVA 
specifically addressed improvements to voting systems and 
voter access that were identified as problems following the 
2000 election.26 HAVA created new mandatory minimum 
standards for states to follow in multiple areas of election 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19 Desilver, supra note 13. 
20 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1720. 
21  Cory Bennet, States Ditch Electronic Voting Machines, THE HILL
(Nov. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/222470-
states-ditch-electronic-voting-machines.  
22 Id.
23 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 
(2002). 
24 Id.
25 Presidential Statement on Signing the Help America Vote Act, 2002 
WL 31421560 (Oct. 29, 2002). 
26 Id.
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administration.27 The Act also provided funding to assist 
states in meeting those standards. 28  HAVA additionally 
established the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) to 
assist states in HAVA compliance and to distribute the Act’s 
funds to the states.29 One of the Act’s loftiest goals was the 
phasing out of punch-card voting systems and the 
replacement of outdated voting machines.30
Ultimately, this move towards electronic voting 
brought Direct Record Electronic Machines (“DREs”) into 
precincts across the country. DRE machines were first 
introduced in the 1970s, but did not rise to prominence until 
the early 2000s. 31  They are “stand-alone machines that 
record votes in their internal memories.”32 Crucially, DREs 
were “only used by 10.7% of American voters” during the 
2000 presidential election.” 33  Yet by the 2004 election, 
28.9% of Americans were voting using DREs.34
Critically, after the 2000 election, concerns over 
election technology were not only expressed in the 
legislature, these same concerns were also echoed in the 
American court system. Voting rights advocates in several 
states “filed lawsuits seeking to require the replacement of 
antiquated systems.” 35  While the lawsuits varied, each 
relied on the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore36,
arguing “the use of different types of voting equipment with 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
27 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 
(2002). 
28 52 U.S.C. § 20901(b) (2018). 
29 52 U.S.C. § 20921 (2018). 
30 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 
(2002). 
31 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1722. 
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Desilver, supra note 13. 
35 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1729. 
36 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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different levels of accuracy within a state violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”37 For example, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) brought suit on behalf of Florida 
voters to end punch card voting in the state. 38
Subsequently, the ACLU “brought lawsuits in Georgia, 
Illinois, California, and Ohio on similar grounds.” 39
Plaintiffs argued in each of these cases that “the continuing 
use of punch-card voting equipment denied their rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights 
Act.”40 Crucially, while the success of these lawsuits was 
mixed 41 , this onslaught of litigation demonstrated an 
appetite in the United States for drastic change in the 
realm of election administration. 
II. Problems with Electronic Voting  
The flaws in the American election system are widespread 
and plaguing. Critically, this is true from the low to high 
end of the voting technology spectrum. During every 
election numerous votes are lost due to voting technology 
shortcomings.42 In 2008, the ten lowest failure rates (the 
percent of votes cast, but not counted) among the states due 
to voting technology and voter confusion fell below 0.5%.43
However, in states that fared worse, the rate of failure was 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
37 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1729. 
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1729-30.  
42 Adam Liptak, Lost Votes, Problem Ballots, Long Waits? Flaws Are 
Widespread, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/02/06/us/politics/us-voting-flaws-are-widespread-
study-shows.html.  
43 Id.
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much higher. For example, in West Virginia the failure rate 
was 3.2%,44 a concerning yet unsurprising figure.  
In 2006, Princeton professor of computer science 
Edward Felten obtained an AccuVote TS, one of the most 
widely used touch-screen voting machines at the time. 45
Felten and his team began the process of reverse-
engineering the AccuVote TS.46 In September 2006, they 
published a research paper, and released a video, detailing 
how code could be spread to an AccuVote TS, completely 
changing the record of the votes to whatever outcome the 
code writers desired.47 Furthermore, such code could spread 
like a virus to other machines.48 Several other projects have 
been performed on other direct-recording electronic voting 
machines, showing similar results.49 Despite this, Georgia 
still uses the AccuVote TS, and four other states—
Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey and South Carolina—still 
rely entirely on DRE machines. 50 This is critical, as the 
machines that pose the greatest risk to election integrity 
are electronic machines that leave no voter-verified paper 
trail. 51  “If someone were to manipulate such a voting 
machine’s underlying software, there would be no way to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
44 Id.
45  Jessica Schulberg, Good News for Russia: 15 States Use Easily 
Hackable Voting Machines, HUFFPOST (Jul. 17, 2017, 11:02 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/electronic-voting-machines-hack-
russia_us_5967e1c2e4b03389bb162c96. 
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 A.J. Vicens, Trump Says the Election Will Be Rigged. In These States, 
It May Be Impossible to Prove Him Wrong, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 9, 
2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/millions-
voters-could-cast-ballots-machines-leave-no-paper-trail/. 
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prove it by comparing the machine’s vote count to a paper 
record.”52
This sentiment was echoed in June 2017 when more 
than 100 cybersecurity and voting experts penned a letter to 
Congress suggesting several objectives for protecting the 
integrity of the election system.53 The letter came in the 
wake of Jeanette Manfra, Acting Deputy Undersecretary for 
Cybersecurity and Communications at the Department of 
Homeland Security, notifying the Senate Intelligence 
Committee that hackers targeted election-related systems 
in 21 states during the 2016 election cycle.54 Critically, in 
the letter, the experts state, “all jurisdictions should create 
voter-verified paper ballots and phase out electronic voting 
machines” to handle the increase in cybersecurity risks.55
While there has never been a proven case of 
manipulation of an electronic voting machine, that does not 
indicate their infallibility. In fact, the greatest downfall of 
electronic voting machines might come in the form of their 
aging software and imperfect engineering. DRE machines, 
without any known malicious tampering, have historically 
produced questionable results. 56  In Florida, “more than 
18,000 iVotronic machines did not record a vote in a 2006 
congressional race in which the margin of victory was less 
than 400 votes.”57 Meanwhile, in Fairfax County, Virginia, 
“electronic machines subtracted one vote for every hundred 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
52 Id.
53 Selena Larson, 100 Experts Tell Congress How to Improve Election 
Security, CNN (Jun. 21, 2017, 1:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/ 
21/technology/voter-security-letter-sent-to-congress/index.html.  
54 Id.
55 Id.
56  Andy Sullivan, Despite Flaws, Paperless Voting Machines Remain 
Widespread in the U.S., REUTERS (Sep. 20 2016, 7:38 AM), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-machines/despite-flaws-paperless-
voting-machines-remain-widespread-in-the-u-s-idUSKCN11Q0EU. 
57 Id.
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cast for one candidate in a 2003 school-board race.” 58
Further “more than 4,400 electronic ballots in Carteret 
County, North Carolina, were lost and never recovered in 
the 2004 presidential election.”59 These events highlight the 
very real consequences these machines can impose when 
glitches occur.
These DRE machines may also jeopardize election 
integrity simply due to the passage of time. As most DRE 
machines were purchased in the wake of the 2000 election 
debacle, the age of these devices raises real concerns.60 For 
machines purchased since 2000, the expected lifespan for 
the core components is generally between ten and fifteen 
years.61 This is worrisome, as the oldest voting machines in 
forty-three states were at least ten years old by the 2016 
election.62 In fourteen states they were more than fifteen 
years old.63
One of the most obvious problems with aging 
equipment is calibration. A number of voting machines still 
in commission rely on hardware from the 1990s to calibrate 
their screens.64 Often at polling places, the accuracy of the 
calibration of these machines noticeably degrades 
throughout the day.65 This has led to complaints of “vote 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
58 Id.
59 Id.
60  Lawrence Norden & Christopher Famighetti, America’s Voting 
Machines at Risk, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 9 (2015), https://www. 
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Americas_Voting_Mac
hines_At_Risk.pdf. 
61 Id. at 4.  
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Pam Fessler, Some Machines Are Flipping Votes, But That Doesn’t 
Mean They’re Rigged, NPR (Oct. 26, 2016, 1:13 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499450796/some-machines-are-flipping-
votes-but-that-doesnt-mean-theyre-rigged.  
65 Id.
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flipping”.66 In Texas, during the 2016 election, a number of 
“voters in at least three counties reported they had selected 
straight Republican tickets, only to have Clinton/Kaine pop 
up instead of Trump/Pence.” 67  Most election officials are 
aware of the problem of aging voter technology, but have 
come up against tightened state and county budgets, 
resulting in the replacement of these machines as 
unfeasible.68  This is not surprising as estimates suggest 
replacing old electronic voting machines in the United 
States could top $1 billion.69
III. STATE REVERSION FROM ELECTRONIC 
VOTING
Since the late 2000s, many states have passed legislation 
reverting away from electronic voting. 70  Maryland was 
among the first states to abandon paper balloting after the 
2000 presidential election.71 The state spent $65 million in 
2002 to buy electronic voting machines from Diebold, 
Incorporated.72 However, issues with these machines arose 
shortly after.  For example, in Maryland’s 2006 primary 
election, glitches plagued the polling stations leading state 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
66 “Vote flipping” is the act of an electronic voting machine recording a 
vote for the opposite selection chosen by the voter. Id.
67 Id.
68  Lawrence Norden & Chistopher Famighetti, Now Is the Time to 
Replace Our Decrepit Voting Machines, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2016, 12:07 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/11/now 
_is_the_time_to_fix_our_old_voting_machines.html.  
69 Id.
70  Cory Bennet, States Ditch Electronic Voting Machines, THE HILL
(Nov. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/222470-
states-ditch-electronic-voting-machines. 
71 Erin Cox, New Voting Machines Finally On Horizon, BALT. SUN (Dec. 
16, 2014, 8:50 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/ 
politics/bs-md-voting-machines-20141216-story.html.  
72 Id.
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leaders to “urge voters to cast paper absentee ballots 
instead.”73
Thus, in 2007, the Maryland General Assembly 
unanimously passed Chapter 548 of the 2007 Acts.74 This 
bill required a new voter-verifiable paper record voting 
system to replace the touchscreen voting system, which had 
proven susceptible to hacks and glitches.75 However, budget 
concerns delayed funding for the new system until 2014, as 
estimates indicated switching to the voter-verifiable paper 
system would cost the state $28.1 million.76 Ultimately, the 
State Board of Elections’ contract to lease new voting 
equipment was finalized in December 2014, and the system 
was used for the first time in the 2016 presidential 
election. 77  Other states like California and Ohio, have 
addressed the issue by adding printers to their touch-screen 
machines allowing for a backup paper trail if necessary.78
In the summer of 2017, the Virginia State Board of 
Elections also moved to do away with touchscreen voting 
machines, imposing the state’s November elections as the 
deadline for phasing out all such machines.79 This decision 
came in the wake of Virginia’s Department of Elections 
recommending the decertification of touchscreen voting 
machines.80 The recommendation was made “after security 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
73 Id.
74 2007 Bill Text MD H.B. 18 (May 17, 2007).  
75 Id.
76 Voting Systems, MD. STATE BD. OF ELEC., http://www.elections.state. 
md.us/voting_system/learn_about_the_new_voting_system.html. 
77 Id.
78  Andy Sullivan, Despite Flaws, Paperless Voting Machines Remain 
Widespread in the U.S., REUTERS (Sep. 20 2016, 7:38 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-machines/despite-flaws-
paperless-voting-machines-remain-widespread-in-the-u-s-
idUSKCN11Q0EU. 
79 Id.
80 Id.
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experts breached numerous types of voting machines with 
ease at the DEF CON cybersecurity conference in Las Vegas 
in July 2017.81 It is also not coincidental that the move 
came amid “heightened concerns over foreign interference 
in future elections, in light of the U.S. intelligence 
community’s conclusion that Russia used cyber-attacks and 
disinformation to interfere in the 2016 presidential 
election.”82  This however was not the first time Virginia 
faced dilemmas in regards to voting technology. In 2015 
Virginia decertified thousands of insecure WinVote 
machines. 83  A security researcher describing the matter 
stated, anyone within a half mile could have modified every 
vote, undetected without any technical expertise. 84
Therefore, the serious implications of these security 
vulnerabilities are beginning to be addressed at the state 
level.  
IV. THE STATE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING 
TODAY 
Today, there are many ways Americans cast their votes. 
Roughly 80% of Americans vote with paper ballots or vote 
on machines that leave a paper trail.85 However, that leaves 
20% of Americans casting ballots with no paper record.  
Voters in “Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey, and 
South Carolina all use machines with no paper trail, as do 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Kim Zetter, Virginia Finally Drops America’s ‘Worst Voting Machines’,
WIRED (Aug. 17, 2015 7:00 am), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/virg 
inia-finally-drops-americas-worst-voting-machines/. 
84 Id.
85 A.J. Vicens, Trump Says the Election Will Be Rigged. In These States, 
It May Be Impossible to Prove Him Wrong, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 9, 
2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/millions-
voters-could-cast-ballots-machines-leave-no-paper-trail/. 
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voters in some parts of Texas, Tennessee, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Kansas, 
Mississippi, and Florida.” 86  These counties, in sum, had 
more than 60 million registered voters as of November 
2014, a sizable portion of the entire voting population.87 The 
scale of this problem is particularly troubling, as errors, 
whether malicious or unintentional, could alter the results 
of not only state and local elections, but also national 
elections. Thus, this problem concerns voters regardless of 
whether they reside in jurisdictions that use non paper-
verifiable voting methods.  
V. IMPLICATIONS IN THE STATES 
The 2016 presidential election demonstrated the particular 
vulnerabilities of electronic voting systems. On November 8, 
2016, in Durham, N.C., electronic poll books used to check 
voter registration malfunctioned in the morning, forcing 
voters to wait in long lines and use paper back-up copies.88
In response, the Southern Coalition for Social Justice filed a 
lawsuit “in hopes of forcing the Durham County Board of 
Elections to keep polls open an additional 90 minutes.”89
Ultimately, voting was “extended by the state Board of 
Elections for up to an hour in eight precincts affected by the 
malfunctions.”90
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Mark Berman, William Wan, & Sari Horwitz, Voters Encounter Some 
Malfunctioning Machines, Other Headaches on Election Day, WASH.
POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/ 
wp/2016/11/08/election-day-voters-report-long-lines-intimidation-and-
confusion-in-some-parts-of-the-country/?utm_term=.b5b16ae87eeb.  
89 Id.
90 Id.
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Meanwhile, in Colorado “portions of the state’s voter-
verification system went down for about 30 minutes in the 
afternoon, briefly forcing state officials to issue provisional 
ballots to an undisclosed number of voters, and also briefly 
preventing them from processing mail ballots.” 91  In 
Washington County, Utah, election officials had “to 
scramble to get electronic voting machines back up and 
running after machines at many precincts failed to operate 
immediately after polls opened at 7 a.m.”92 Only 99 of the 
380 machines had correctly programmed memory cards.93
Similar electronic voting machine malfunctions slowed lines 
in Philadelphia, Detroit, and Manhattan.94
 On the other hand, in Maryland, where paper ballots 
were utilized for the first time in over a decade, some voters 
also faced delays.95 In Baltimore County, voters reported 
more than two-hour waits in precincts with only one ballot 
scanner. 96  In several polling places the scanners broke 
down, “requiring voters to place their ballot sheets into 
secured boxes affixed to the machines”. 97  However, 
ultimately, fewer than 20 of the 2,900 ballot scanners 
malfunctioned on Election Day in the state, a relative 
success.98 A far better result than in 2004 where reports 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
91 Richard Wolf & Kevin McCoy, Voters in Key States Endured Long 
Lines, Equipment Failures, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2016, 6:03 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/08/votin
g-polls-election-day/93201770/. 
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Doug Donovan & Scott Dance, Election Hiccups in Maryland: Delays, 
Long Lines, Adjusting to Paper Ballots, BALT. SUN (Nov. 8, 2016 10:52 
p.m.), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-electi 
on-day-20161108-story.html.  
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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showed “voters in three counties never even saw the Senate 
primary on their voting machine screens.”99
 Beyond the typical malfunctions and glitches, 
malicious hacking also plagued the 2016 presidential 
election. While there is no evidence of manipulation of 
voting or tabulation machines, breaches of election-related 
data did occur. 100  For example, in Arizona and Illinois, 
Russian hackers breached the states’ internet-linked voter 
registration databases.101 The exposure of these registration 
databases is particularly troubling as in nearly every state, 
one cannot vote if he or she is not registered.102 Thus, such 
breaches can indirectly affect election integrity. 
Furthermore, these breaches, regardless of their direct 
impact, can have further repercussions by undermining 
public confidence in the election system’s integrity more 
broadly.103
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
99 Merrill Fabry, A Brief History of Voting Problems on Election Day,
TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4531415/history-voting-problems-
election-day/. 
100  Ellen Nakashima, Russian Hackers Targeted Arizona Election 
System, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/national-security/fbi-is-investigating-foreign-hacks-of-state-
election-systems/2016/08/29/6e758ff4-6e00-11e6-8365-b19e428a975e 
_story.html?utm_term=.4d78656ea220. 
101 Id.
102  Eli Watkins, How to Register to Vote in Every U.S. State and 
Territory, CNN (Oct. 12, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/14/ 
politics/how-to-register-to-vote-in-every-us-state-and-territory/ index. 
html. 
103  Massimo Calabresi, Election Hackers Altered Voter Rolls, Stole 
Private Data, Officials Say, TIME (Jun. 22, 2017), http://time.com/ 
4828306/russian-hacking-election-widespread-private-data/.  
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VI. THE CASE FOR SECURE AND STANDARD 
VOTING TECHNOLOGY 
Ultimately, voting technology is almost entirely controlled 
at the state level. 104  In the United States there are no 
mandatory standards for voting technologies set by the 
federal government. 105  However, there are voluntary 
standards for computer-based voting systems developed by 
the Federal Election Commission at the direction of 
Congress.106 Additionally, the administration of elections is 
nearly always handled at the county or local level.107 As a 
result of this form of administration, there is a great 
amount of variability regarding the way Americans vote 
from precinct to precinct. In fact, almost all states use more 
than one voting technology, and a number of states use all 
five forms of technology.108 Thus, the United States, which 
began its democracy with only one method for casting votes, 
now has a patchwork approach to voting that has only been 
exacerbated in recent decades by the introduction of several 
new voting technologies.109 Despite this variance in voting 
methods, what the various jurisdictions have in common is 
plaguing election administration concerns over efficiency 
and reliability. 
Interestingly, a natural convergence among the 
states, in regards to resolving these issues, is currently 
occurring. Voting through the use of scan-technology has 
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been occupying an increasingly larger portion of precincts 
since 2006. 110  This is a positive trend as it indicates a 
solution to these ongoing dilemmas might finally be 
emerging. While no solution can fix every problem, scan-
technology appears to be the most effective in this regard. 
Furthermore, this trend is likely to continue as more than 
40 out of 50 states have plans to update their voting 
machinery before the 2020 election.111
This shift to scanned ballots is likely to address many 
of the issues seen consistently throughout the spectrum of 
voting technology. Paper ballots are generally considered 
superior to electronic voting machines in terms of 
verifiability.112 Even machines that are high end and well 
maintained cannot sufficiently address the systemic issues 
of electronic voting. The inability to manually recount, to 
properly audit, to prevent rigging and widespread fraud, 
simply cannot be divorced from DRE machines. 113  Yet, 
simply relying on paper ballots is time consuming in terms 
of counting, and as a result, a nearly obsolete practice.114
Scanned ballots overcome this issue of efficiency, while still 
offering a back-up trail to identify inconsistencies and verify 
results if issues do arise.115 Furthermore, scanned ballots 
address the issue of decipherability due to human variance, 
as the scanner indicates if a form is not sufficiently 
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readable, by adhering to certain standards of readability 
which are necessary for a scanner to function properly.116
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the pendulum of American electoral politics has 
swung back in favor of paper-verifiable voting methods, and 
this trend seems likely to stay. While direct recording 
electronic voting is incredibly efficient in terms of ballot 
counting, it simply is too vulnerable to attacks, and does not 
offer a sufficient fallback so that in the event of a failure, 
glitch, or attack, the integrity of the vote count is not 
compromised. On the other end of the spectrum, low 
technology voting, such as print-ballots, is relatively time 
consuming, labor intensive, and error-prone due to 
indecipherability and human mistake. Thus, since 2000, as 
states moved rapidly from one end of this voting technology 
spectrum to the other, many of the problems of election 
integrity remained uncorrected.  
Ultimately, the nation is now witnessing a period of 
correction. Many states are now moving towards a middle 
ground that incorporates both levels of technology. This is 
scan-voting technology. This model incorporates the 
efficiency of high technology voting whilst offering the peace 
of mind low-technology voting offers. If errors occur, there is 
a corresponding paper ballot, to ensure verifiability is not 
lost.  Thus it is not surprising that 47% of registered voters 
live in areas that now use scan-voting technology, with this 
number projected to rise.117 Meanwhile, since 2006 direct 
recording electronic voting has occupied an increasingly 
smaller percentage of voting precincts, while punch cards 
and paper ballots have nearly disappeared.118 Considering 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
116 Id.
117 Desilver, supra note 13. 
118 Id.
PAIGE REINAUER?
Journal of Business & Technology Law  551
?
the continued issues with DRE voting integrity, and the 
relative inefficiency and risk of human error associated with 
low technology voting, this trend is logical. 
Voting technology in the United States stands as a 
reminder of the importance of centered responses. Each 
election cycle, the nation endeavors to rectify issues learned 
from past elections, however, this has led to over correction 
and the discovery of new obstacles to election integrity. 
These endeavors have often come at a lofty price. 
Ultimately, however, in the last decade states have 
reckoned with this conundrum, and responded 
appropriately, leading the nation to a much-needed, and 
increasingly closer, standard voting technology 
equilibrium—the shift towards scan-voting technology.  
